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Holcomb: Holcomb: Demise of the FAA's Contract of Employment Exception

THE DEMISE OF THE FAA's

"CONTRACT OF
EMPLOYMENT" EXCEPTION?
Gilmer v. Interstate/JohnsonLane Corp.'

I. INTRODUCTION
The recent trend in the federal courts is to expand the scope of the Federal
Arbitration Act2 (FAA) to include statutory claims. 3 Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson
Lane Corp. illustrates this trend by compelling claims under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 19674 (ADEA) to arbitration pursuant to
an arbitration clause in an employment contract' But does this trend neglect the
rights of the individual employee vis-a-vis his employer and does it undermine the
purpose of the "contract of employment" exception in the FAA?'
This Note will examine the Gilmer case and its adherence to the current trend
of expanding the scope of the FAA in the area of statutory claims and also its
refusal to address the issue of the "contract of employment" exception and to
whom it should apply.
II. THE FACTS
Respondent Interstate/Johnson Lane Corporation (Interstate) hired appellant
Robert Gilmer as a Manager of Financial Services in May, 1981. 7 Gilmer's
employment agreement required him to register as a securities representative with
several stock exchanges, one of which was the New York Stock Exchange
(NYSE).8 The registration application contained, among other things, an
arbitration clause which stated he agreed to arbitrate any disputes between him and
Interstate.9

1. 111 S. Ct. 1647 (1991).
2. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1 - 208 (1988) [hereinafter FAA].
3. See infra notes 57-69 and accompanying text.
4. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1988).
5. Gilmer, 111 S. Ct. at 1650.
6. 9 U.S.C. § 1.
7. Gilmer, 111 S. Ct. at 1650.
8. Id.
9. Id. The arbitration agreement also stated that arbitration would be required only when the
dispute is required to be arbitrated "under the rules, constitutions or by-laws of the organizations with
which I register." Id. The relevant rule in this case was New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) Rule 347
which provides, in part, that arbitration is required of "any controversy between a registered
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In 1987, Interstate terminated Gilmer's employment." He was 62 years old
After filing a claim with the Equal Employment Opportunity
at the time.
Commission (EEOC), he brought suit in the United States District Court for the
Western District of North Carolina.' 2 In his petition, Gilmer alleged that
3
Interstate discharged him because of his age, thus violating ADEA provisions.
Interstate then filed a motion to compel arbitration, pursuant to the arbitration
4
agreement in the registration application as well as the FAA.1 In arguing against
the motion, Gilmer alleged that compelling arbitration of ADEA claims would
undermine the purposes and statutory framework of the ADEA.' s The district
court, relying on Alexander v. Gardner-DenverCo., 6 denied Interstate's motion
to compel arbitration of the claim, stating that "Congress intended to protect
ADEA claimants from the waiver of a judicial forum."'" The United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed.' 8 The appellate court found
"nothing in the text, legislative history, or underlying purposes of the ADEA
indicating a congressional intent to preclude enforcement of arbitration
agreements."' 9
Appellant Gilmer, on writ of certiorari,20 sought a determination from the
United States Supreme Court that a compulsory arbitration clause in a securities
registration agreement was not enforceable when the claim was age discrimination
against an employer. 2' The United States Supreme Court affirmed the Fourth
Circuit enforcing the arbitration agreement. 2 In a seven to two decision, the
court held that an age discrimination claim in a securities registration application
to compulsory arbitration under the arbitration agreement and the
was subject
FAA.23

representative and any member or member organization arising out of the employment or termination
of employment of such registered representative." Id. at 1651 (quoting NYSE Rule 347).
10. Id. at 1651.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 1652.
16. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
17. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 895 F.2d 195, 196 (4th Cir. 1990).
18. Id.
19. Id. at 197.
20. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 111 S. Ct. 41 (1990). The writ was granted to
resolve a conflict among the courts of appeals regarding the arbitrability of ADEA claims. Gilmer, 111
S. Ct. at 1651. Compare Gilmer v. Interstate/JohnsonLane Corp., 895 F.2d at 197 (Fourth Circuit
finding "nothing in the text, legislative history, or.underlying purposes of the ADEA indicating a
congressional intent to preclude enforcement of arbitration agreements") with Nicholson v. CPC Int'l
Inc., 877 F.2d 221,222 (3d Cir. 1989) (Congress intended claims under ADEA to be heard in a judicial
forum and to compel arbitration would undermine this intent).
21. Gilmer, 111 S. Ct. at 1651.
22. Id. at 1650.
23. Id.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol1992/iss1/12

2

1992]

Holcomb: Holcomb: Demise of the FAA's Contract of Employment Exception
FAA EXCEPTION
Il1.

LEGAL HISTORY

A. The FederalArbitrationAct
Prior to 1925, courts routinely refused to enforce arbitration agreements
because they "ousted jurisdiction" of the courts and violated public policy. 24 The
purpose behind passing the FAA was to reverse this hostility federal courts2 had
towards arbitration and to "place arbitration agreements upon the same footing as
other contracts." 26
There are two primary sections in the Act. Section two is the substantive
section and section one contains the exceptions to the Act.27 Section two states:
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing
a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy
thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction, or refusal to
perform the whole or any part thereof, . .. shall be valid, irrevocable,
and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for
the revocation of any contract.2
It appears that the only grounds to attack such a clause is on the same grounds
that one attacks ordinary contracts, such as fraud, adhesion, and duress.29
Recognizing this, the Supreme Court ruled that it will not create special common
law rules of unconscionability or adhesion to deal specifically with arbitration
clauses. 30 But the other primary section of the Act, section one, provides another
method of avoiding compulsory arbitration, that is, by falling under one of its
exceptions.
Section one states, among other things, that the Act does not apply to
"contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of

Reflections on
24. Shell, The Role of Public Law in Private Dispute Resolution:
ShearsonlAmerican Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 26 AM. Bus. L.J. 397, 399-400 (1988); see, e.g.,
Cocalis v. Nazlides, 308 I11.
152, 159-60, 139 N.E. 95, 98-99 (1923); Wood v. Humphrey, 114 Mass.
185, 186 (1873); Hurst v. Litchfield, 39 N.Y. 377, 379 (1868).
25. The FAA applies only to commercial arbitration agreements affecting interstate, foreign, or
maritime commerce. Therefore, the act only applies to federal courts. 9 U.S.C. § 2. To enforce
agreements affecting intrastate commerce all 50 states have adopted similar statutes permitting the
enforcement of arbitration clauses. Shell, Res Judicata and CollateralEstoppel Effects of Commercial
Arbitration, 35 UCLA L. REV. 623, 636 n.64 (1988).
26. Gilmer, 111 S.Ct. at 1651 (citing Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 219-20
& n.6 (1985)).
27. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1 - 2.
28. Id. § 2.
29. See generally Shell, supra note 24, at 400.
30. Id. at n.l; see also Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 493 n.9 (1987) (a court may not construe
an arbitration agreement in a manner different from that in which it otherwise construes nonarbitration
agreements under state law).
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workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce."31 Since the Act's adoption,
courts struggled with the interpretation of section two as it applies to statutory
claims and with both the interpretation and application of section one. 2
B. Compulsory Arbitration of Statutory Claims
The Supreme Court first addressed the issue of applying arbitration clauses
to statutory claims in Wilko v. Swan.3 In Wilko, the court held that a claim
under section 12(2) of the 1933 Securities Act a4 was nonarbitrable because the
court doubted the ability of an arbitrator to adequately enforce the special statutory
rights of section 12(2) and because of certain interpretations of the 1933 Act.35
The holding in Wilko created a new defense for parties wanting to avoid
enforcement of arbitration clauses when their claims were based on statutory
rights.3 6 It became known as the "public policy" defense. 7 This defense
focused on the belief that: (1) arbitration would not be an adequate substitute of
the courts in protecting a party's statutory rights; (2) surrendering to arbitration
would be a waiver of one's statutory rights, which would be contrary to public
policy; and (3) the procedural characteristics of arbitration make it unlikely that
courts would be able to correct errors in interpretations of the statute.38
After Wilko, lower courts began applying the "public policy" doctrine to
various statutory claims 39 until the doctrine reached its zenith in the late 1960s
and early 1970's.'
Beginning in 1974, the Supreme Court started expanding
the scope of the FAA while simultaneously eroding the Wilko doctrine.41

31. 9 U.S.C. § 1.
32. See infra notes 33-90 and accompanying text.
33. 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
34. 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1988). The claim was filed by a customer against his securities broker
for misrepresentation. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 428.
35. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 436. Under section 12(2) of the 1933 Securities Act, the defendant has the
burden of proving that any misrepresentation or omission was innocent and could not have been
corrected by the exercise of due care. 15 U.S.C. § 771(2).
36. See Shell, supra note 24, at 404.
37. Id.
38. See, e.g., American Safety Equip. Corp. v. J.P. Maguire & Co., 391 F.2d 821, 827 (2d Cir.
1968); Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp., 444 F. Supp. 68, 70-71 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
39. See, e.g., American Safety, 391 F.2d at 827; Romyn v. Shearson Lehman Bros., 648 F. Supp.
626, 632 (D.C. Utah 1986) (claims under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
(RICO) 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 are not arbitrable); Breyer v. First Nat'l Monetary Corp., 548 F. Supp.
955, 959 (D.C.N.J. 1982) (claims under the Commodities Exchange Act 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-6500 are not
arbitrable); Aimcee Wholesale Corp. v. Tomar Prods., Inc., 21 N.Y.2d 621, 289 N.Y.S.2d 968, 971-72,
237 N.E.2d 223, 225 (1968) (claims under the Sherman Antitrust Act 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-5300 are not
arbitrable).
40. See Shell, supra note 24, at 404.
41. Id.
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Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co. 42 was the first decision that questioned the
Wilko reasoning. In Scherk, the court held that claims arising under section 10(b)
of the 1934 Securities Act 43 were arbitrable under the FAA notwithstanding the
Wilko decision. 44 The court based its decision more on the international context
of the dispute rather than a general
attack on Wilko, but the court's analysis did
45
question the reasoning in Wilko.
The Sherman Act" was the next statutory claim to fall under the FAA. In
47
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth,
the Supreme Court
overruled the line of cases holding that claims under the Sherman Act were
nonarbitrable. 4 The court emphasized the "liberal federal policy favoring
arbitration agreements" when determining whether a statutory claim is subject to
arbitration.49
There is nothing in the FAA that establishes a presumption against arbitration
of statutory claims, thus the court should enforce such clauses unless it is invalid
under reasons recognized at common law.5 ° Therefore, the first task in
determining the validity of an arbitration clause is to determine whether the parties
agreed to arbitrate the dispute.51 The court is to make this determination "with
52
a healthy regard for the federal policy favoring arbitration.
The next step is to consider whether legal constraints external to the parties'
agreement prevents the arbitration of those claims.5 a This is done by determining
whether Congress considered the statutory rights at issue unsuitable for
arbitration.54 Evidence of this can be found by looking at the statute itself or the
legislative history.55 The court determined that the Sherman Act had no such
intent and was therefore subject to arbitration.56
Besides the effects of making claims under the Sherman Act arbitrable, the
Mitsubishi decision also adopted a new trend in the federal courts of enforcing
arbitration clauses in statutory claims unless there was a clear congressional intent

42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
(1983)).
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

417 U.S. 506 (1974).
15 U.S.C. § 10(b) (1934).
Scherk, 417 U.S. at 515-20.
Id. at 513-14.
15 U.S.C. §§ 1 - 5300 (1934).
473 U.S. 614 (1985).
Id. at 640.
Id. at 625 (citing Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24
id.
Id.
Id. (citing Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 24-25).
Id. at 628.
d
Id.
Id. at 640.
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against arbitration."' This new policy, rendered few statutes immune from
arbitration.
In Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon,5 8 the Supreme Court
applied this reasoning to claims under the Securities Act of 193459 holding that
these claims are subject to arbitration.' The court's reasoning, similar to the
reasoning in Mitsubishi, was a strong presumption in favor of arbitration which
could be overcome only by showing a specific congressional intent against
arbitration. 6' The burden of showing this intent was on the party opposing
arbitration by using the text, the legislative history, or evidence of "an inherent
conflict between arbitration and the statute's underlying purposes." 62 The court
held that there existed no such intent or evidence of a conflict in claims arising
under the 1934 Act. 63
The court in McMahon also held that claims arising under the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO)'
were subject to
arbitration. 65 The reasoning was the same as that used concerning the 1934 Act,
that is there was no clear legislative intent against arbitration nor were the policies
behind the RICO statute impeded by allowing arbitration.'
The Wilko case finally met its demise in Rodriguez de Quijas v.
Shearson/American Express, Inc.6 7 In Rodriguez de Quijas, the court held that
claims under the Securities Act of 1933 were arbitrable thus overruling the Wilko
decision." The court's reasoning rejected the Wilko suspicions in the adequacy
of arbitration in the enforcement of the 1933 Act by stating that this logic has
"fallen far out of step with our current strong endorsement of the federal statutes
favoring this method of resolving disputes." '
As the Supreme Court was expanding the FAA, it never directly confronted
the issue of the enforceability of an arbitration clause in disputes between an
employer and an individual employee, until the Gilmer decision. 70 This failure

57. See Shell, supra note 24, at 406.
58. 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
59. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b).
60. McMahon, 482 U.S. at 238.
61. Id. at 227.
62. Id. (citing Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 217 (1985)).
63. McMahon, 482 U.S. at 238.
64. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (1970).
65. McMahon, 482 U.S. at 242.
66. Id.
67. 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
68. Id. at 485.
69. Id.
70. Gilmer, 111 S. Ct. at 1660. The Supreme Court did enforce an arbitration clause in the
context of a collective bargaining agreement. General Elec. Co. v. United Elec., Radio & Machine
Workers, 353 U.S. 547, 548 (1957). Although the Supreme Court had not ruled on the enforceability
of arbitration agreements in the context of an individual employee, several lower courts have. See, e.g.,
Nicholson, 877 F.2d at 230 (claims under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act 29 U.S.C. § 621
can not be arbitrated without frustrating the intent of Congress); Swenson v. Management Recruiters
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raised the issue of how the courts are to interpret the "contract of employment"
exception in section one and to whom is it to apply. The lower courts have
struggled with this issue since the passage of the Act and there has been much
among them as to its scope and Congress' underlying
confusion and disagreement
71
it.
behind
purpose
C. InterpretingSection One
Section one contains two requirements that must be satisfied before one can
be exempted from the act. 72 First it requires the contract in dispute to be a
"contract of employment." 3 Secondly, the employee must fall within a certain
class of employee, such as "seamen, railroad employee, or any other class of
workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce."7 4 The disparity among the
and which
courts arises from interpreting the meaning of "contract of employment"
75
employees are "engaged in foreign or interstate commerce.
The majority of case law concerning the "contract of employment" issue is
in the area of collective bargaining agreements.76 In those cases, the courts treat
these agreements as employment contracts within the exception and thus not
subject to compulsory arbitration.77
While the courts regularly deal with the exception in the context of collective
bargaining, few decisions concern individual employment contracts and the
application of section one to them. Cases confronting individual claims focus on
the meaning of "engaged in interstate commerce" rather than the meaning of
"contract of employment."78 These cases also emphasized the strong presumption
in favor of arbitration rather than confronting the issues raised by section one.79

Int'l, 858 F.2d 1304, 1307 (8th Cir. 1988) (claims arising under Title VII are not subject to arbitration);
Donahue v. Susquehanna Collieries Co., 138 F.2d 3, 6 (3d Cir. 1943) (compelling arbitration of claims
brought under the Fair Labor Standards Act 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 - 219).
71. See sources cited infra note 76.
72. See 9 U.S.C. § 1; see also text accompanying note 31 supra.
73. See 9 U.S.C. § 1; see also text accompanying note 31 supra.
74. 9 U.S.C. § 1; see also text accompanying note 31 supra.
75. See sources cited infra note 76.
76. See, e.g., United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29,36 (1987); United Food
& Commercial Workers Local 7R v. Safeway, 889 F.2d 940, 944 (10th Cir. 1989); Bacashihua v.
United States Postal Serv., 859 F.2d 402, 405 (6th Cir. 1988); Tenney Eng'g v. United Elec. Radio &
Mach. Workers, 207 F.2d 450, 452 (3d Cir. 1953); Harris Hub Bed & Spring Co. v. United Elec.,
Radio & Mach. Workers, 121 F. Supp. 40, 41 (M.D. Penn. 1954).
77. See cases cited supra note 76.
78. See, e.g., Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc. v. Liang, 493 F. Supp. 104, 106 (N.D. I11.1980)
(contract between New York Stock Exchange brokerage firm and employees involving interstate
commerce is to be governed by FAA. The court never addressed the issue of whether the contract falls
within the exception); Dickstein v. du Pont, 320 F. Supp. 150, 152 (D.C. Mass. 1970) (an account
executive is not a worker engaged in interstate commerce for purposes of the Section one exception).
79. See cases cited supra note 76.
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Interpretation of the second requirement of section one, the class of
employee, receives more judicial notice than does defining "contract of
employment."80 The majority of courts adhere to a narrow definition of "other
class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce." 8' In Tenney
Engineeringv. United ElectricalRadio & Machine Workers,82 the court reasoned
that since the specified class of workers under the exclusion, seamen and railroad
employees, was engaged directly in interstate or foreign commerce, the "other
class" of workers must also be engaged directly in interstate or foreign.
commerce. 83 Therefore, workers engaged in the production of goods for
subsequent sale in interstate commerce do not fall under the exclusion in section
one.

84

Overall, the courts give the exclusion a very narrow interpretation if they
address the issue at all. 5 Few courts even consider congressional intent for
guidance in applying section one to employment contracts." In fact, section one
was not even intended to apply to disputes between employer and employee as
witnessed in a statement by the chairman of the ABA committee responsible for
drafting the Act:
[The bill] is not intended to be an act referring to labor disputes, at all.
It is purely an act to give the merchants the right or the privilege of
sitting down and agreeing with each other as to what their damages are,
87
if they want to do it. Now that is all there is in this.
Notwithstanding this, the courts readily use the FAA to enforce arbitration
clauses in employment contracts, citing the trend of favoring alternative dispute
resolutions as their reasoning while ignoring obvious congressional intent to limit
the Act from contracts of employment.ss Finally, in Gilmer, the Supreme Court
heard a dispute between an individual employee and his employer and whether the

80. See cases cited supra note 76 (none of which attempt to define "contract of employment").
81. See, e.g., Bacashihua, 859 F.2d at 405 (court held that postal employees were a class of
workers engaged in interstate commerce for purposes of the FAA exclusion); see also cases cited supra
note 76.
82. 207 F.2d 450.
83. id. at 452.
84. Id. at 453. Several courts have followed this narrow definition. See, e.g., cases cited supra
note 76.
85. See supra notes 75-84 and accompanying text.
86. See supra notes 75-84 and accompanying text.
87. Gilmer, 111 S. Ct. at 1659 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Hearing on S. 4213 and S. 4214
Before the Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,67th Cong., 4th Sess. 9 (1923) [hereinafter
Hearing]).
88. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 76. The Supreme Court was guilty of doing this in Gibner.
111 S. Ct. at 1651; see infra notes 95 & 96 and accompanying text.
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FAA exclusion should apply to the case in light of congressional intent.89 Even
so, the Court chose not to address the issue. 90
IV. THE INSTANT DECISION
A. The Majority Opinion9 1
The majority in Gilmer held that a claim under the ADEA was subject to
arbitration pursuant to an arbitration clause in an application to the NYSE and
pursuant to the FAA.9 2 The Court addressed two basic arguments: whether
compulsory arbitration would frustrate the purpose of the ADEA, and whether
allowing such arbitration was inconsistent with two prior Supreme Court decisions
between employer and employees. 93 Since the issue of whether section one of
the Act precluded arbitration of employment disputes was not raised on appeal, the
Court reduced the issue to a footnote. 94 The Court held that the arbitration clause
was not in a "contract of employment," because it was in Gilmer's application to
the NYSE and not in his contract with Interstate.9" Therefore, the contract did
not implicate section one.'
In reaching the conclusion that arbitration did not frustrate the purposes
behind the ADEA, the Court reasoned that while it is true arbitration focuses on
specific disputes between the parties, so does judicial resolution of claims.97
Both of these methods can further the social purposes behind the statute. 98
The Court found the argument that arbitration would undermine the role of
the EEOC in enforcing the ADEA 99 unpersuasive because a claim subject to
arbitration can still be filed with the EEOC, and indeed Gilmer did so.' °° Also,
the EEOC's goal in eliminating discrimination is not dependent upon the filing of
a charge against an employer because the agency receives information on alleged

89. Gilmer, 111 S. Ct. at 1652 n.2.
90. See id.
91. Justice White delivered the opinion, joined by the Chief Justice, Kennedy, O'Connor, Scalia,
Souter, and Blackmun. Id. at 1650.
92. Id. at 1657.
93. Id. at 1652 & 1656.
94. Id. at 1651 n.2.
95. Id. In its analysis, the Court expressed no concerns that Interstate required Gilmer to apply
with the NYSE as part of his employment. Id. at 1650. The Court concluded that it would leave the
issue of whether all contracts of employment fall under the exceptions of Section one for another day.
Id. at 1652 n.2.
96. Id. at 1652 n.2.
97. Id. at 1653.
98. Id.
99. Id. Under section 626(d) of the ADEA an individual must file a charge with the EEOC before
he can file a civil suit. 29 U.S.C. § 626(d). The civil suit is extinguished, however, if the EEOC files
a suit against the employer. Id. § 626(cXl). Before the EEOC can bring an action, it must attempt
to eliminate the discriminatory practice through informal methods. Id. § 626(b).
100. Gilmer, 111 S. Ct. at 1653.
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Gilmer also argued that the forced
violations from several "sources." ''
arbitration deprived him of a judicial forum provided for by the ADEA. 10 2 The
Court rejected this by stating there was no explicit intent in the text nor in the
legislative history to preclude arbitration of ADEA claims.' 0 3
Arguing that arbitration would frustrate the purpose of the ADEA, Gilmer
contended that arbitration procedures were inadequate to handle ADEA
claims."
The Court rejected this argument based on several reasons.0" In
addressing the bias claim, the Court stated that it was unwilling to "indulge in the
presumption" that the arbitral body will be biased.'06 Concerning the limited
discovery claim, the Court stated that it is doubtful that ADEA claims require
more extensive discovery than other statutory claims where arbitration has been
allowed, such as RICO and antitrust claims.' ° The appellate review argument
was dismissed because the NYSE rules require the findings of the arbitrator to be
in writing.'08 The equitable relief argument was likewise rejected because the
NYSE rules do not restrict the types of relief an arbitrator may award. °9
Gilmer also claimed that due to the unequal bargaining power between
employer and employee, compelling arbitration frustrates the purpose of the
ADEA." O The Court held that mere inequality in bargaining power is not a
sufficient reason to hold that arbitration agreements are never enforceable in the
employment context."' A court will invalidate an arbitration clause if the
agreement to arbitrate "resulted from the sort of fraud or overwhelming economic
power that would provide grounds for the 'revocation of any contract.' " 2 In
this case, there was no evidence of such fraud or coercion." 3
Gilmer also argued that to compel arbitration in this case would contradict
the holdings in Alexander v. Gardner-DenverCo., and Barrentinev. Arkansas-Best
FreightSystem, Inc."14 In those cases, the Supreme Court held that claims under
Title VII" 5 and claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act" 6 were not

101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 1654.
104. Id. Gilmer claimed that (1) arbitration panels would be biased, (2) the discovery allowed in
arbitration is more limited than in judicial proceedings such that it is difficult to prove discrimination,
(3) arbitrators do not issue written opinions therefore preventing effective appellate review and finally,
(4) the procedures do not provide for broad equitable relief and class actions. Id. at 1654-55.
105. Id. at 1654-55.
106. Id. 1654 (citing Mitsubish4 473 U.S. at 634).
107. Id.
108. Id. at 1655.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 1656 (citing Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 627).
113. Id.
114. 450 U.S. 728 (1981).
115. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e - 2000e17 (1964).
116. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 - 219 (1938).

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol1992/iss1/12

10

1992]

Holcomb: Holcomb: Demise of the FAA's Contract of Employment Exception
FAA EXCEPTION

arbitrable because arbitration would frustrate the purpose of those acts." 7 In
Alexander, the Court held that Congress intended federal courts to exercise final
enforcement of Title VII and deferral to arbitral decisions would be incompatible
with that intent." 8 In Barrentine,the Court held that congressional intent in the
FLSA was to give employees a right to bring their minimum-wage claim in a
judicial forum." 9 To compel arbitration in such claims would frustrate that
intent."
The Court in Gilmer distinguished those cases thus avoiding the
undesirable job of overruling them. 1 2 ' Because of these reasons, the Court held
that Gilmer had failed to meet his burden of showing that Congress intended to
preclude arbitration of2 claims under the ADEA and therefore the claims were
subject to arbitration.1
B. The Dissent23
The dissent listed three reasons why ADEA claims cannot be compelled to
arbitration: (1) the majority avoided the primary issue, (2) compulsory arbitration
would frustrate Congressional intent of the ADEA, and (3) Congress did not
intend for the FAA to apply to parties of unequal bargaining power. 24
The dissent believed that the majority avoided the main issue in the case.'2
Justice Stevens stated, "[t]he Court today ...[in its holding], skirts the antecedent
question of whether the coverage of the Act even extends to arbitration clauses
contained in employment contracts, regardlessof the subject matter of the claim
at issue.,

126

The dissent was referring to section one of the FAA 127 and the

apparent intent of Congress in adding that section. 28 Stevens disagreed with the

117. Barrentine, 450 U.S. at 742; Alexander, 415 U.S. at 56.
118. Alexander, 415 U.S. at 56.
119. Barrentine,450 U.S. at 745.
120. Id.
121. Gilmer, 111 S.Ct. at 1657. The Court found three reasons to distinguish. First, GardnerDenver and Barrentine "did not involve the issue of the enforceability of an agreement to arbitrate
statutory claims." Id. Rather, they involved the issue of "whether arbitration of contract-based claims
precluded subsequent judicial resolution of statutory claims." Id. Secondly, the arbitration clauses in
Gilmer and Barrentine occurred in the context of collective-bargaining agreements and these courts
were concerned about the tensions between collective representation and individual statutory rights.
Id. Finally, those cases were not decided under the FAA because they involved intrastate commerce
and therefore were not decided under the "liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements." Id.
(citing Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 625).
122. Id.
123. Justice Stevens wrote the dissent, joined by Justice Marshall. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. (emphasis added).
127. See supra text accompanying note 31.
128. See Gilmer, 111 S.Ct. at 1657.
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majority's narrow interpretation of that section stating that Congress' intent when
passing the Act was for it not to be applied to employment disputes.129
His second argument was that compelling arbitration of ADEA claims would
frustrate the congressional purpose behind the ADEA. 130 Broad injunctive relief
is the "cornerstone to eliminating discrimination in society" and because arbitration
does not have this characteristic much of the purpose behind ADEA would not be
13
realized. 1
Finally, Stevens argued that it is doubtful Congress intended the FAA to
apply to statutory claims arising from contracts between parties of unequal
bargaining power, such as employer and employee.1 32 The Court, in its holding,
has "put to one side any concern about the inequality of bargaining power between
an entire industry, on the one hand, and an individual customer or employee, on
the other.' 33
V. COMMENT
The Gilmer decision illustrates the trend of expanding the FAA to include
more and more statutory claims. 34 But in its attempt to continue the trend, the
Supreme Court expanded the FAA into individual employment disputes without
considering the underlying purpose of section one. The majority addressed the
issue in a footnote by giving a pure textual reading of the phrase-"contracts of
employment." 35 No arguments were made as to the congressional intent behind
section one of the Act and thus it seems the Court gave no consideration of it.
But as the dissent points out, there is evidence that Congress intended the Act to
be limited to commercial disputes. 36 An important reason behind this intent is
Congress' awareness of the unequal bargaining power between employer and
employee. 37 Senator Walsh succinctly stated this awareness in the hearings
before the Judicial Committee considering passage of the FAA:
It is the same with a good many contracts of employment. A man says,
"These are our terms. All right, take it or leave it." Well, there is
nothing for the man to do except to sign it; and then he surrenders his
have it tried before
right to have his case tried by the court, and has 13to
8
a tribunal in which he has no confidence at all.

129. Id. at 1659.
130. Id. at 1660.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 1661.
133. Id.
134. See supra notes 42-69 and accompanying text.
135. Gilmer, 111 S. Ct. at 1651 n.2.
136. Id. at 1658-60.
137. Id. at 1661.
138. Id. at 1659 (citing Hearing, supra note 87, at 9) (Senator Walsh's testimony before the
Senate Committee on the Judiciary).
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Holcomb: Holcomb: DemiseFAA
of theEXCEPTION
FAA's Contract of Employment Exception

The majority in Gilmer does address the issue of unequal bargaining power, but
addresses the issue in the context of common law defenses to enforcement of a
contract. 13 9 Since unequal bargaining power existed between parties in some of
the Court's prior decisions which upheld the arbitration clause, the majority held
that disparity in bargaining power would not be enough to invalidate an arbitration
agreement. 40 What the Court failed to consider was whether section one
expressed the intent by Congress to preclude the Act from applying to employment
disputes because of the inherent inequality in bargaining power between employer
and employee. 41
Footnote two could be foreshadowing any interpretations the Supreme Court
will give section one, but the footnote itself gives little guidance to the lower
courts.1 42 What is the meaning of "any other class of employees?"' 43 It is
apparent that Congress did recognize the unequal bargaining power between
1 44
employer and employee and thus attempted to protect employees.
Notwithstanding this intent, lower courts have continuously interpreted the
exclusion narrowly. 45 The Gilmer case gave the Supreme Court a chance to
take that congressional intent and put it into a working46definition of section one.
Instead the Court disposed of the issue in a footnote.
As for the "public policy" defense first espoused in Wilko, the Court's
decision in Gilmer seems consistent with the recent trend of expanding the FAA
to include statutory claims unless there is a clear intent in the text or the
legislative history of the statute precluding arbitration.147 The Court has
increasingly rejected the idea that arbitration is an inadequate forum to hear
statutory claims 4 ' and the Gilmer case follows this trend. 4 9 In fact, it seems
that the Gilmer case is demonstrative of the eventual demise of the "public policy"
defense by an increasingly expansive interpretation of the FAA.

139. Id. at 1655.
140. Id.
141. It could be argued that by reducing the question to a footnote and narrowly defining
"contracts of employment" the Court did in fact address the issue and found no such intent from
Congress to prevent employment disputes from the scope of the FAA. See supra notes 94-95 and
accompanying text.
142. See Stempel, Reconsidering the Employment ContractExclusion in Section 1 of the Federal
ArbitrationAct: Correctingthe Judiciary'sFailureof Statutory Vision, 1991 J. DiSP. RESOL. 259, 275.
143. See supra text accompanying note 31.
144. See supra notes 87 & 138 and accompanying text.
145. See supra notes 72-88 and accompanying text.
146. Gilmer, 111 S. Ct. at 1652-53 n.2; see supra text accompanying note 94.
147. See supra notes 42-69 and accompanying text.
148. See supra notes 42-69 and accompanying text.
149. See Gilmer, 111 S. Ct. at 1654-55.
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VI. CONCLUSION

The results of the Gilmer decision will undoubtedly be an expansion of the
FAA into employment disputes. By focusing on the trend favoring arbitration
rather than Congress' intent to exclude employment contracts from the Act, the
Court has left in doubt the future effect section one will have on employment
disputes. Since it is clear that the recent trend is to favor arbitration in suits
involving statutory claims, the Court must eventually decide on the apparent
conflict between this trend and section one of the Act. Until that time the lower
courts will be left to decide whether section one has any life remaining.
MICHAEL G. HOLCOMB
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